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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tial relationship.19 Judicial protection has been denied on the ground
that a voluntary disclosure of the idea causes it to become common
property. 20 This does not mean that there may not be a limited dis-
closure 21 so as to apprise the purchaser of what is being offered to
him. "If it were held otherwise the mere offer to sell would destroy
the thing offered." 22
The present case is decided in a manner which the court thinks
more in accord with modern legal developments and substantial jus-
tice. A novel idea, tangible in form and disclosed under express or
implied contract, is a legally protected property right.
It is submitted on the one hand, that a truly ingenious idea, so
difficult to create, warrants a higher claim to be treated as property
than mere physical possessions. Failure to protect these ideas would
result in a removal of the profit motive, which is their impetus, and
consequently the free flow of progressive ideas to the general public
would be retarded. On the other hand, the apparent willingness of
the courts to protect these ideas and their tremendous commercial
value, especially in the field of radio, television and motion pictures,
has brought an avalanche of claimants asserting that they are orig-
inators of ideas which have been unscrupulously appropriated. Thus
the likelihood of nuisance suits is evident. Any attempt to resolve
this apparent conflict must undertake to reconcile the need for ade-
quate legal protection to men of ability with the necessity for dis-
couraging arbitrary and vexatious suits based on unfounded claims
to originality.
INSURANCE-PURcHASER's RIGHTS TO PROCEEDS OF VENDOR'S
PoLIc.-Plaintiff-purchaser brought an action for specific perfor-
mance of a contract for sale of real property and to recover a portion
19 See Shubert v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 Misc. 734, 741, 72 N. Y. S.
2d 851, 857 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd mem., 274 App. Div. 751, 80 N. Y. S. 2d
724 (1st Dep't 1948) ; see Note, 23 A. L. R. 2d 244, 254 (1952).20 See Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 43 F. 2d 685, 686 (2d Cir. 1930) ; Bowen
v. Yankee Network, Inc., supra note 18, at 63; Bristol v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc'y, supra note 18, at 267, 30 N. E. at 507 (1892).
21 See Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 35 Cal. 2d 653, 221
P. 2d 73, 80 (1950) (recording audition for a radio program does not make
the idea public property); How J. Ryan & Associates, Inc. v. Century Brew-
ing Ass'n, 185 Wash. 600, 55 P. 2d 1053, 1054 (1936). For further examples
of limited disclosures, see Warner, Protection of the Content of Radio and
Television Programs by Common Law Copyright, 3 VAND. L. Rtv. 209, 229
(1950).
22 How J. Ryan & Associates, Inc. v. Century Brewing Ass'n, supra note
21, 55 P. 2d at 1054.
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RECENT DECISIONS
of the proceeds of a fire insurance policy, taken in the name of the
vendor and upon which the purchaser paid the premiums. Recog-
nizing the validity of an oral modification of the contract of sale,' the
court decreed specific performance. In denying plaintiff's claim to a
portion of the proceeds, the court held that the policy was for the
benefit of the insured, the vendor, the purchaser having no claim to
the proceeds, even though he paid the premiums. Cowan v. Suther-
land, 117 N. Y. S. 2d 365 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
The English common-law rule, that the risk of loss in an execu-
tory contract for the sale of land falls on the purchaser,2 has been
adopted by the majority of jurisdictions in the United States.3 In
an apparent effort to mitigate the harshness of the rule, it has been
modified so as to allow the uninsured purchaser the right to have the
proceeds of the vendor's fire insurance policy applied toward the re-
duction of the unpaid portion of the purchase price.4 In England,
however, the rule has been strictly applied to the uninsured purchaser.
In the celebrated case of Rayner v. Preston, it was held that the
benefits of the vendor's fire insurance policy belonged to the vendor,
the purchaser having no claim to the proceeds in the absence of any
contractual stipulation to the contrary. Subsequently, the rule in
England was changed by act of Parliament, allowing the purchaser
to recover the proceeds of the vendor's policy, upon completing pay-
ment of the purchase price, where the purchaser has paid a propor-
tionate part of the premiums. 7
The New York Court of Appeals has strictly adhered to the
doctrine promulgated in Paine v. Meller,8 imposing the risk of loss
on the purchaser as soon as the contract of sale has been made.9 The
seeming harshness of such a rule was somewhat alleviated by statute
in New York.10 Under this statute, the Uniform Vendor and Pur-
chaser Risk Act, the risk of loss is deemed to fall upon the purchaser
1 The court also held that the conversation of the purchaser and vendor
subsequent to the fire, constituted a valid offer and acceptance which, combined
with part payment of the reduced purchase price, created a valid modification
of the written contract. It further denied vendor's counterclaim for damage
to his personal property left in the possession of the purchaser, since the
vendor failed to show lack of due care by the purchaser.
2 See Lysaght v. Edwards, 2 Ch. D. 499, 507 (1876); Paine v. Meller,
6 Ves. 349, 352, 31 Eng. Rep. 1088, 1089 (1801).
3 See Vanneman, Risk of Loss, In Equity, Between the Date of Contract
to Sell Real Estate and Transfer of Title, 8 MixN. L. Rsv. 127 (1924) : LEG.
Doc. No. 65(M), 1936 REPoRT, N. Y. LAw RmIsIoN Commissiox 757, 771.
4 See Note, 37 A. L. R. 1324 (1925), and cases collected therein.
5 18 Ch. D. 1, 50 L. J. Ch. (N.s.) 472 (1881).6 Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 GRo. 5, c. 20, § 47.
7 Id. at (2). See 29 HALSBuRys LAWS OF ENGLAND 342 (2d ed. 1938).
8 6 Ves. 349, 31 Eng. Rep. 1088 (1801).
9 Sewell v. Underhill, 197 N. Y. 168, 90 N. E. 430 (1910); see Brownell
v. Board of Education, 239 N. Y. 369, 374, 146 N. E. 630, 632 (1925).ON. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 240-a.
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only when he has gone into possession or taken title." The provi-
sions of this statute were construed so as to deny the purchaser any
rights to the vendor's policy, unless expressly so provided.12
In applying the rule, the New York courts recognize the basic
principles of insurance law which limit recovery on the policy to those
in privity or named as beneficiaries therein.' 3 In addition, the courts
apparently reason that where the risk of loss falls upon the purchaser,
he has an insurable interest,14 and should not depend on the vendor's
policy for indemnification. Thus the equitable concept of the vendor
holding the proceeds of his policy as trustee for the benefit of the
purchaser, as recognized by the majority of American jurisdictions,15
is rejected in New York.' 6
The instant case presented the courts of New York with an op-
portunity to restrict the harsh application of the rule, to cases where
the purchaser is in possession but has not paid the premiums. A
rule which would, in such a case, allow the purchaser a proportionate
share of the insurance proceeds would achieve substantial justice. It
is submitted that the court's failure to seize upon this opportunity to
limit an inequitable rule was unfortunate. It would seem that if a
change is to be effected it is more likely to be brought about by legis-
lation than by judicial decision.
PROPERTY-MONEY LEFT ON SHELF IN BANK VAULT-MISLAID
NOT LosT.-Plaintiff sought to recover a $100 bill delivered by her
to an employee of defendant bank after she had discovered it lying
on the shelf of a writing booth adjacent to the safe-deposit vault, in
21 See Rosenbloom v. Maryland Ins. Co., 258 App. Div. 14, 16, 15 N. Y. S.
2d 304, 306 (4th Dep't 1939) ; New York Medical College v. 15-21 East 111th
Street Corp., 90 N. Y. S. 2d 591, 592 (Sup. Ct. 1949); see World Exhibit
Corp. v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 270 App. Div. 654, 658, 61 N. Y. S.
2d 889, 893 (2d Dep't), affd nern., 296 N. Y. 586, 68 N. E. 2d 876 (1946).
12 Matter of Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Co., 63 N. Y. S. 2d 120 (Sup.
Ct. 1946).
13 See Brownell v. Board of Education, supra note 9, at 374, 146 N. E. at
632. But see Persico v. Guernsey, 129 Misc. 190, 194, 220 N. Y. Supp. 689,
693 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mei., 222 App. Div. 719, 225 N. Y. Supp. 890 (4th Dep't
1927).
14 See Carpenter v. German American Ins. Co., 135 N. Y. 298, 31 N. E.
1015 (1892); Brooks v. Erie Fire Ins. Co., 76 App. Div. 275, 78 N. Y. Supp.
748 (3d Dep't 1902), affd inem., 177 N. Y. 572, 69 N. E. 1120 (1904) ; N. Y.
INsuRANcE LAW § 148.
25 See Note, 37 A. L. R. 1324 (1925), and cases collected therein.
6 2See Brownell v. Board of Education, 239 N. Y. 369, 372-74, 146 N. E.
630, 632 (1925). But see Persico v. Guernsey, supra note 13.
